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CATCHING SIGHT OF CREDENCE
ATTRIBUTES: COMPELLING PRODUCTION
METHOD DISCLOSURES ON EGGS
Aurora Paulsen *

INTRODUCTION
Production methods on modem farms hardly resemble those
of even half a century ago, but most consumers would not know it.
Even more, consumers may not understand how new production
methods alter food quality. To correct misperceptions concerning
modem egg production, several citizens' groups, Compassion Over
Killing, the Animal Legal Defense Fund, and the Penn Law Animal
Law Project, filed a petition with the United States Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") asking that it require producers to label shell
eggs - eggs sold while still in their shells - with information about

methods of production.1
According to the petition, information about whether eggs are
produced humanely is important to many consumers. Although words
and images on egg cartons are often deliberately reminiscent of the
small farms of previous generations, which presumably granted
chickens freedom of movement and time outside, most egg-laying
hens are raised under intensive confinement, 2 unable to take more
* Aurora Paulsen obtained her B.A. from Reed College and expects to obtain a
J.D. with a certificate in Environmental and Natural Resources Law from Lewis &
Clark Law School in May 2012. Ms. Paulsen would like to thank Carter Dillard for
uniformly insightful advice. She would also like to thank her mom and brother, and
her nonhuman family members Fossa, Remington, Mara, and Dandy. Ms. Paulsen
has greatly appreciated the editorial help of the staff at the Loyola Consumer Law
Review.

1Petition by Compassion Over Killing, Inc. et al., to Dep't of Agric., Food
Safety & Inspection Serv., Citizen'sPetition to Change the Labeling Requirements
for Eggs Sold in the United States, (Dec. 2010) [hereinafter Compassion Over

available
al.],
et
Inc.
Killing,
www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/PetitionCompassionOverKilling_123010.pdf.
2
id.
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at
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than a few steps in tiny wire cages and lacking access to the outdoors
and natural light.3 Thus, the current labels on eggs often mislead
consumers.
The petition also asserts that, in addition to being produced in
a manner inconsistent with product labeling, eggs from caged hens
contain lower nutrient levels than eggs from free-range hens, and are
more likely to carry Salmonella than eggs from hens that were not
raised in cages.4 To remedy consumer confusion, the citizens' groups
urged the FDA to adopt a three-tiered disclosure system: Free-Range
Eggs, Cage-Free Eggs, and Eggs from Caged Hens.5 Such disclosures
on eggs are essential, because consumers pay premiums to purchase
eggs produced using added-quality production methods, such as free
range or cage free production, but they may not actually be getting
See

Factory

Egg

Production,

http://www.farmsanctuary.org/issues/factoryfarming/eggs/
2011).

FARM

SANCTUARY,

(last visited Nov. 22,

4 Id. at 25 (citing S. Van Horrebeke et al., Determination of the Within and
Between Flock Prevalence and Identification of Risk Factors for Salmonella
Infections in Laying Hen Flocks Housed in Conventional and Alternative Systems,
94 PREVENTATIVE VETERINARY MED. 94 (2010) (finding that caged laying hens are

twenty times more likely to transmit Salmonella than cage-free hens)); id. at 27
(citing Heather D. Karsten, et al., Vitamins A,E and Fatty Acid Composition of the
Eggs of Caged Hens and Pastured Hens, 25

RENEWABLE

AGRIC. & FOOD SYS. 45

(2010) (reporting that eggs from pastured hens had higher concentrations of omega3 fat and vitamins A and E than eggs from caged hens)).
*Id at 6. The petition recommends the following definitions:
(1) The labels on egg containers containing eggs that are laid by hens that
are not confined to cages, and are given readily and easily available
access to outdoor pastures which all hens can access at once, with living
vegetation and accessible overhead cover,.for the period of their lives
during which they produce eggs, excluding actual transport or during the
provision of veterinary care by a licensed veterinarian though not for a
period to exceed ten (10) days shall bear the designation 'Free-Range
Eggs.' (2) The labels on egg containers containing eggs that are laid by
hens that are not confined to cages but kept in a bam or other enclosed
structure in which they are permitted to move freely for the period of their
lives during which they produce eggs, excluding actual transport or
during the provision of veterinary care by a licensed veterinarian though
not for a period to exceed ten (10) days shall bear the designation 'CageFree Eggs.' (3) The labels on egg containers containing eggs that are laid
by hens that are confined to a cage for any period of their lives during
which they produce eggs, excluding actual transport or during the
provision of veterinary care by a licensed veterinarian though not for a
period to exceed ten (10) days, shall bear the designation 'Eggs From
Caged Hens.'
Id. at 6-7.
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higher quality eggs.6
The transmission of commercial information that occurs
through labels may be viewed through an economic lens. Part I of
this Comment provides background on the economics of food
selection. Part II outlines labeling requirements applying to eggs,
federal policy on labeling production method information, and the
qualitative effects production methods have on eggs. Part III provides
background on the economics of information, and maintains that
disclosing production methods on eggs remedies a current
information asymmetry between egg producers and egg consumers.
The three-tiered disclosure system this Comment advocates requires
the compulsion of commercial speech, which has First Amendment
implications, so Part IV discusses First Amendment doctrine on
compelled commercial speech. Part V asserts that mandating
production method disclosures on egg cartons is reasonably related to
governmental interests in preventing consumer deception and in
allowing consumers to distinguish between material aspects of foods,
and is therefore permissible. This Comment concludes that a threetiered system would help prevent deception of egg consumers, and
that such a system of disclosures is likely to be constitutional.

I. BACKGROUND ON THE ECONOMICS OF FOOD SELECTION
Food selection is among the most basic of human activities,
and many consumers feel strongly about the food products they
select. As rational self-maximizers, consumers select food products
based on the expected utility of those products considering many
qualities when calculating the utility of foods. Consumers' food
preferences may be influenced by, among other things, religious
ideals, ethical standards, the view that political beliefs are exercised
by "voting with one's purse," and personal risk assessments, such as
those associated with novel foods or foods produced by
unconventional techniques. Like other economic choices, purchasing
decisions are made in the margins, so relatively small differences
between food products are often significant to consumers when they
are calculating utility. If their perceptions of qualities are incorrect,
consumers miscalculate the utility of the foods they select.8
The optimal level of food quality is met when both producers
6

See infra pt. II.

7 Julie A. Caswell & Eliza M. Mojduszka, Using Information Labeling to
Influence the Market for Quality in Food Products, 78 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1248,
1248 (1996) [hereinafter Caswell & Mojduszka, Information Labeling].
8
Id.
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and consumers have perfect information about a food's attributes,
transaction costs are low, and market prices fully reflect all
externalities. 9 If any of these characteristics is absent, market
inefficiencies occur. .For example, when information asymmetry
exists, high-quality products may be undersupplied, because
consumers will not pay for an attribute that may or may not be
present.' 0 Thus, the overall level of quality may be lower than in a
world of perfect information and, eventually, markets for the highquality good may not exist." In this way, market performance
depends on the efficacy of quality signaling.
To align food purchases with their preferences, consumers
compare foods based on a number of attributes. Economists have
divided product attributes into three categories: search attributes,
experience attributes, and credence attributes." These categories of
attributes result from differing levels of information symmetry
between producers and consumers.
Consumers can evaluate a product's search attributes, such as
the color or size of fish or the ripeness of vegetables, prior to
purchase.14 Advertising for search attributes is usually accurate
because consumers can perceive a food's characteristics and evaluate
the ad's claims.15 Thus, consumers' purchasing decisions directly
incentivize producers to provide the range of search attributes that
consumers prefer.' 6 Because the market for search attributes

9 Id. at

1249. Examples of externalities caused by food production are damage
to soil caused by overuse of land for growing crops and pesticide runoff entering
waterways.
10Julie A. Caswell & Eliza M. Mojduszka, A Test of Nutritional Quality
Signaling in Food Markets Prior to Implementation of Mandatory Labeling, 82

Am. J. AGRic. ECON. 298, 298-99 (2000) [hereinafter Caswell & Mojduszka,
NutritionalQuality].
" Id.at 298.
12 Id. at 298-99.
13 See, e.g., Caswell & Mojduszka, Information Labeling,
supra note 7, at

1249; Julie A. Caswell & Daniel I. Padberg, Toward a More Comprehensive
Theory of FoodLabels, 74 AM. J. AGRIC. EcoN. 460, 460-61 (1992); Christopher
Chen, Food and Drug Administration Food Standards of Identity: Consumer
Protection Through the Regulation of Information, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 186-87
(1992); John M. Church, A Market Solution to Green Marketing: Some Lessons
from the Economics of Information, 79 MINN. L. REv. 245, 273-76 (1994).
1 See Church, supra note 13, at 273 (asserting that "[c]onsumers determine
'search' qualities before making a purchase.").
" Id. at 274.

16Caswell & Mojduszka, InformationLabeling, supra note 7, at 1249.
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functions well, government regulation in this area is relatively rare.' 7
Unlike search attributes, experience attributes, such as a
food's taste and cooking properties, are not available to consumers
prior to purchase.' 8 Consumers are only able to evaluate experience
attributes when they use a product. 1 Because these attributes are not
available to consumers before they select a product, a moral hazard
arises: producers may be motivated to substitute a lower quality
experience attribute in the interest of profit, knowing that purchase
will occur before dis*covery of the substitute. 20 This moral hazard is
particularly problematic with products . that are purchased
infrequently, such as cars. However, the information problem can be
mitigated with products purchased repeatedly, such as foods.2 1 For
example, a consumer who has been tricked into buying a food that
tastes bad will simply avoid that product in the future. Eventually
consumer preference drives a disfavored product from the market;
therefore, the government becomes involved with regulating foods'
experience attributes only infrequently. 2 3
Like experience attributes, credence attributes are not
available to consumers prior to purchase.2 4 Unlike experience
attributes, however, credence attributes are often difficult or even
impossible to evaluate through purchase and consumption.25
Examples of credence attributes include nutritional contents and
methods of food production, such as information about pesticide
application or safety precautions used in producing the food.2 6
Because products with the credence attribute may be, or may seem to
be, physically identical to products that do not have the credence
attribute, producers face the moral hazard of substituting a product
with lower qualities for a product with added credence attributes.
After substitution, producers may set a price that reflects the higher
quality product, because they know that it is very difficult for
17Id. An

exception is the regulation of consumer fraud, including regulations
set forth in the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act of 1966. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1461
(2006).
18See Chen, supranote 13, at 188.

"
20 Id. at 187.

Id at 188.

21 id

Id. at 188-89.
Caswell & Mojduszka, Information Labeling, supra note 7, at 1250.
See Chen, supra note 13, at 189.
25 id
26 See Caswell & Mojduszka, Information Labeling, supra note 7, at 1250
22

23
24

(arguing that food safety is often a credence attribute because consumers may be
unable to link a food with the illness it caused).
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consumers to tell the difference. Information asymmetries for these
qualities are so pronounced that "economic models of quality hit a
dead end when they come to discussion of credence attributes." 27 To
remedy information asymmetries surrounding credence attributes,
consumers often rely on reputable systems of certification. 28 Thus,
the government may elect to play a role in certification by regulating
or requiring labels about credence attributes.2 9

II. BACKGROUND ON LABELING EGG CARTONS
The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") oversees the
labeling of most foods, including shell eggs. One responsibility of
this oversight is ensuring that the labeling on egg cartons is truthful
and does not mislead consumers. Nevertheless, despite FDA
oversight, egg cartons are still routinely labeled in ways that confuse
consumers and deprive them of the capacity to select eggs with high
quality attributes, such as superior nutrient contents or a decreased
risk of transmitting Salmonella.
A. Oversight ofLabeling on Egg Cartons
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938
("FDCA")3 o and the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990
("NLEA"),3 1 which amended the FDCA, most foods are subject to
certain labeling requirements.32 In addition, Congress adopted the
'Fair Packaging and Labeling Act ("FPLA")33 in 1966 to prevent
deceptive trade practices and ensure that the public receives accurate
information about the values of consumer commodities.34 According
27

Id.
Id. at 1251.
29 Id. One notable example is federal oversight of the National Organic
Program. The National Organic Program is governed by the Organic Foods
Production Act of 1990 and its enacting regulations. 7 U.S.C. § 6503 (2006); 7
C.F.R. § 205 (2006).
30 Pub. L. No. 101-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified in scattered sections of
21 U.S.C.).
" Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (1990) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). The regulations supporting the NLEA can be
found at 21 C.F.R. § 101.9 (2006).
32 See PATRICIA CURTIS, GUIDE TO FOOD LAWS AND REGULATIONS: FOOD
LABELING 85 (2005).
28

3
34

15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1461 (2006).

See NEAL D. FORTIN, FOOD REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, POLICY, AND
PRACTICE 50 (2009) (asserting that the FPLA was passed to "prevent unfair and
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to the Congressional declaration of policy that introduces the Act,
"[i]nformed consumers are essential to the fair and efficient
functioning of a free market economy," and "[p]ackages and their
labels should enable consumers to obtain accurate information as to
the quantity of the contents and should facilitate value
comparisons." 5 The FDA ensures that producers are in compliance
with the FDCA, the NLEA, and the FPLA.
Section 403 of the FDCA3 7 provides the FDA 38 with the
authority to oversee the labeling on shell eggs.3 9 Primarily, section
403 prohibits misleading labeling and requires that voluntary labeling
be truthful. 40 The FDCA also requires producers to label information
such as a food's contents and net weight, ingredients, and identity, as
well as the name of the manufacturer. Under section 321(n) of the
FDCA, the FDA can require the disclosure of two types of
information: facts that are "material" to the "consequences" of a
food's use, and facts that are "material" in light of a producer's own
representations about a food.42
B. FoodLabeling Policy

The federal government rarely mandates the labeling of
production method information. One exception is the requirement
that food products produced abroad be labeled with their country of
origin.43 This requirement serves to provide information for
deceptive trade practices, and to provide consumers with accurate information
regarding the quantity and value of products").
3

15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1461.

Guidance for Industry: A Food Labeling Guide, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HuMAN
SERVS.,
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
available
at
36

http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/GuidanceD
ocuients/FoodLabelingNutrition/FoodLabelingGuide/default.htm.
3 21 U.S.C. § 401 (2006).
.
38 Fred H. Degnan, Biotechnology and the Food Label, in LABELING
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD: THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 18-19
(Paul Weirich ed., 2007).
3 See FORTIN, supra note 34, at 90 (stating that "[t]he FDA labeling
requirements apply to all foods except meat, poultry, and egg products"); see also
CURTIS, supra note 32, at 108 (stating, "The Food and Drug Administration ... is
responsible for ensuring that foods sold in the United States are safe, wholesome,
and properly labeled. This applies to foods produced domestically, as well as foods
from foreign countries.").
40 Degnan, supra note 38, at 18.
4' See 21 U.S.C. §§ 343(e), (g), (i).
42
Id. § 321(n).
43 See 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (2006).
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consumers who are concerned about food safety in other countries.
Another exception is the requirement that producers label foods that
have been irradiated,4 which is a process that involves treating the
food with ionized radiation to kill bacteria and other microorganisms,
and to keep foods from spoiling for longer periods of time.45
In explaining its decision to mandate the labeling of irradiated
foods, the FDA stated in 1986 that it considered "whether consumers
view such information as important and whether the omission of label
information may mislead a consumer."4 6 However, in 2007 the FDA
explained that "[i]n the past, FDA policies on irradiation labeling
have focused on the fact that the food has been processed .

. .

. In

recent years, FDA policies on the labeling of foods have focused on
the results of the processing of the food rather than the processing
itself."A7 Nevertheless, the FDA still requires producers to label
irradiated foods. 48 Besides these exceptions, the federal government
rarely mandates the labeling of production method information.
Unlike irradiation, the presence of genetically modified
("GM") ingredients need not be reported.4 9 Currently, more than 70%
" See Ionizing Radiation for Treatment of Food, 21 C.F.R. § 179.26(c) (2008).
Food products that have been irradiated must be labeled with a radiation warning
statement identifying the product as either "[t]reated with irradiation" or "[t]reated
by irradiation." Id. at 179.26(c)(2).
45 See Irradiation:A Safe Measurefor Safer Iceberg Lettuce and Spinach, U.S.
2 (Aug. 22, 2008), available at
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,

http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/UCM143389.pdf
. The FDA has determined that irradiating foods is safe for consumers, and, as one
example, that irradiated iceberg lettuce and spinach "retain their nutrient value[s]
and are safe to eat." Id.
46 Irradiation in the Production, Processing and Handling of Food, 51 Fed.
Reg. 13,376, 13,388 (April 18, 1986) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 179).
47 Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and Handling of Food, 72 Fed.
Reg. 16,291, 16,295 (proposed April 4, 2007) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 179).
Notably, the FDA's 2007 statement observed that its policies had changed, not that
its earlier interpretation was impermissible.
48 See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-309R, FEDERAL
OVERSIGHT OF FOOD IRRADIATION 2 (2010). The U.S. Government Accountability
Office ("GAO"), however, observed in 2010 that the FDA does not require a
product's ingredient list to disclose that an ingredient, rather than the whole food,
has been irradiated, and stated that "FDA officials told us that they do not collect
information on how irradiated foods are labeled and marketed." GAO, Food
Irradiation: FDA Could Improve Its Documentation and Communication of Key
Decisions on FoodIrradiationPetitions,GAO-10-309R (Feb. 16, 2010), available

at htt ://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-309R.
4 Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg.
22,984, 22,991 (May 29, 1992).
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of processed foods contain GM ingredients.5 0 Although it was
initially cautious about labeling GM food products, the FDA
eventually adopted its "substantial equivalence" doctrine, which
asserts that an altered food will not be labeled if it is substantially
equivalent to its non-altered counterpart. 5 ' As the FDA opined in
1992, "Federal government regulatory oversight should focus on the
characteristics and risks of the biotechnology product - not the
process by which it is created."5 2
Furthermore, unless the product complies with organic
standards,. which prohibit GM ingredients and foods, it is very
difficult for producers to adopt labeling that advertises an absence of
GM ingredients, because the FDA has imposed strict limitations on
the voluntary labeling of non-GM foods.5 3 For example, the FDA has
stated that claims such as "not genetically modified" and "GMO free"
are misleading, and that such voluntary claims need to be
substantiated, which is expensive for a producer. 54 The FDA's
decision not to mandate the labeling of GM food products has been
upheld.5 5
As with GM foods, the FDA does not require producers to
label products from animals treated with artificial hormones." Two-

50 Robert Streiffer & Alan Rubel, Genetically Engineered Animals and the
Ethics of Food Labeling, in LABELING GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD 66 (Paul

Weirich ed., 2008).
51 Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory Authority: Planned
Introductions of Biotechnology Products Into the Environment, 57 Fed. Reg. 6753,
6760 (Feb. 27, 1992).
Id. at 6753.
See Neil D. Hamilton, The Law of Food: Eight Questions Shaping
America'sFoodPolicy, STATE & LOCAL FOOD POLICY PROJECT, 5 (Nov. 11, 2002),
52

53

http://www.statefoodpolicy.org/docs/policy.pdf.
54 Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have Not Been
Developed Using Bioengineering, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 2001),

http://www.fda.gov/food/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidancedocu
ments/foodlabelingnutrition/ucm059098.htm.
5

See, e.g., Alliance for Biointegrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 179

(D.D.C. 2000). Not all nations follow the American model, however: the EU
requires that producers label GM food products and food products with GM
ingredients. See Margaret Rosso Grossman, European Community Legislationfor
Traceability and Labeling of Genetically Modified Crops, Food, and Feed, in
LABELING GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD 45-46 (Paul Weirich ed. 2008).
5
6 See DANIELE NIERENBERG, HAPPIER MEALS: RETHINKING THE GLOBAL
available at
ed.
2005),
(Lisa
Mastny
INDUSTRY
50
MEAT
http://www.universityofcalifornia.edulsustainability/documents/worldwatch-happ
meals.pdf.
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thirds of beef cattle are treated with artificial hormones, and up to
one-third of American dairy cows are treated with the artificial
bovine growth hormone rbST (also known as rBGH) to increase milk
production.5 8
Producers are not required to label milk from cows that have
been treated with rbST." Many groups, including organizations such
as the Instifute for Responsible Technology, allege that human
consumption of milk from cows treated with rbST leads to an
increased risk of several types of human cancers.6 0 In addition,
treating cows with rbST causes cows to develop mastitis, sores, and a
number of other ailments.61
In 1994, the FDA stated that, absent disclaimers asserting that
milk from cows treated with rbST is substantially equivalent to milk
from untreated cows, labels asserting that milk is rbST-free "may
imply that milk from untreated cows is safer or of higher quality than
milk from treated cows," 62 and may thus be misleading. Following
the FDA's guidance, the Second Circuit denied Vermont the right to
require the labeling of milk from rbST-treated cows in 1996. In

5 Loren Tauer, The Impact of Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin on Dairy
Farm Profits: A Switching Regression Analysis, 8 J. OF AGROBIOTECHNOLOGY
MGMT. & EcoN. 33, 33 (2005), availableat http://www.agbioforum.org/v8nl/v8n1
a05-tauer.pdf (stating that "[r]bST was not available in 1993, but one third of these
farmers used rbST in 1994").
5 See C. Ford Runge & Lee Ann Jackson, Negative Labeling of Genetically
Modified Organisms (GMOs): The Experience of rBST, 3 J. OF
AGROBIOTECHNOLOGY MGMT. & ECON. 58, 61 (2000), available at
http://www.agbioforum.org/v3nl/v3nla09-runge.pdf (discussing voluntary labeling
of products from animals treated with rbST).
6 See Samuel Epstein et al., Petition Seeking the Withdrawal of the New
Animal Drug Application Approval for Posilac - Recombinant Bovine Growth
Hormone (rBGH), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMiN. (May 11, 2007), http://www.fda.gov
/ohrms/dockets/dockets/07p0059/07p-0059-supOO01-02-voll.pdf.
61 STEVEN P. MCGIFFEN, BIOTECHNOLOGY: CORPORATE POWER VERSUS THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 56 (2005). The EU banned the addition of artificial hormones in
1988. NIERENBERG, supra note 56, at 50.
62 Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk and Milk Products
From Cows That Have Not Been Treated With Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin,
59 Fed. Reg. 6279-04, 6280 (Feb. 10, 1994).
63 Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1996). The
dissent asserted that although the FDA did not find rbST to pose health risks to
humans, "there are many possible reasons why a government agency might fail to
find health risks, including inadequate time and budget for testing, insufficient
advancement of scientific techniques, insufficiently large sampling populations,
pressures from industry, and simple human error." Id. at 76-77. The dissent
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2010, the Sixth Circuit held that the Ohio Department of Agriculture
could mandate that milk producers who advertised their nonuse of
artificial growth hormones include a disclaimer on their products,
stating, "The FDA has determined that no significant difference has
been shown between milk derived from rbST-supplemented and nonrbST-supplemented cows.""

The FDA had previously issued a

Guidance determining that milk producers could voluntarily label
their products with statements such as "from cows not treated with
rbST."M5 However, the agency cautioned that such labels had the
potential to be "false and misleading" and should be placed in proper
context because consumers may mistakenly believe that milk from
untreated cows is of a higher quality or is safer.6
As it has done for GM foods and products from animals
treated with artificial growth hormones, the FDA has determined that
producers need not label products from animals given sub-therapeutic
antibiotics. Sub-therapeutic antibiotics are antibiotics given below the
level used to treat disease in order to promote rapid growth.67 The
Government Accountability Office concluded that in 2002 livestock
animals were treated with thirteen million pounds of antibiotics; a
government study found that 80 to 90% of the antibiotics given to
livestock are used for weight gain and lower mortality.68 Experts
contend that such widespread use -of sub-therapeutic antibiotics in
animals destined for human consumption increases the risk of
antibiotic resistance in humans, and that antibiotic resistant pathogens
have already transferred from animals to humans. 69 Resistance to
antibiotics increases hospital costs by an estimated four billion
dollars per year. 70
Furthermore, despite a growing interest in the treatment of
farm animals and the difficulty in ascertaining animal husbandry
concluded that finding the potential harm from recombinant technology not to be
real was "alarming and dangerous," and "extraordinarily unrealistic" at a minimum.
Id. at 77.
6 Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 634 (6th Cir. 2010).
66 Id

id.

67

at 633.

See Low Level Use of Antibiotics in Livestock and Poultry, FOOD MKTG.

INST., http://fini.org/docs/media/bg/ antibiotics.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2011).
68

See Jayson L. Lusk et al., Consumer Demandfor a Ban on Antibiotic Drug

Use in PorkProduction,88 AMER. J. AGR. EcoN. 1015, 1015 (2006).
69 See id
70

Id. The EU banned the use of antibiotics as growth promoters in 2006.

William D. McBride et al., SubtherapeuticAntibiotics and Productivityin U.S. Hog
Production, 30 REv. AGRIC. EcoN. 270, 271 (2008), available at

http://ddr.nal.usda.gov/bitstream/10113/36676/1/IND44059456.pdf.
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practices, the federal government does not require producers to label
food products with any information about animal welfare standards.
As these examples suggest, the FDA has declined to mandate
the labeling of production method information even in instances
where evidence suggests that the production method may have
bearing on human health and safety. If it decides that an
unconventional food is substantially equivalent to its conventional
counterpart, the FDA chills some voluntary labeling.
C. ProductionMethods Impact MaterialAspects ofEgg Qualities
In 2008, there were 280 million laying hens, 7 2 most of which
lived in cages so small that they were unable to spread their wings.7 3
In the U.S., the average amount of space a laying hen is allotted in a
battery cage is between 48 and 54 square inches, but laying hens need
72 square inches to stand comfortably. 74 Hens in battery cages are
unable to take more than a few steps, and they have no access to fresh
air, natural light, or the outdoors. As reported by an egg industry
group, United Egg Producers, 95% of eggs are produced using such
battery cage systems. 6
Studies have shown that information about whether eggs are
produced humanely is important to many consumers. For example,
according to a 2000 Zogby International poll, 86% of respondents
found it unacceptable to confine hens in battery cages. 77 Similarly, a
7' See The Truth Behind the Labels: Farm Animal Welfare Standards and
Labeling
Practices,
FARM
SANCTT JARY,

http://www.farmsanctuary.org/issues/campaigns/truth-behindlabeling.html
(last
visited Nov. 22, 2011) (noting that animal producers and food retailers have come
up with labeling systems to appeal to consumer interest, but not identifying any
similar federal labeling systems).
72

Farm Animal Statistics: Slaughter Totals, THE HUMANE SOC'Y OF THE U.S.,

http://www.humanesociety.org/news/resources/research/stats_slaughter-totals.html
(last modified Nov. 7, 2011).
7

The

Welfare

of Hens

in

Battery

Cages,

FARM

SANCTUARY,

http://www.farmsanctuary.org/issues/factoryfarming/eggs/ (last visited Nov. 22,
2011).
74 Joy Mench, PhD, Welfare Problems of Laying Hens, UNITED POULTRY
CONCERNS, http://www.upc-online.org/fall2001/well-beingconferencereview
.html#layer (last visited Nov. 22, 2011).
7
76

See Factory Egg Production,supra note 3.

PROMAR INT'L, IMPACTS OF BANNING CAGE EGG PRODUCTION IN THE
UNITED STATES 2 (Aug. 2009), availableat http://www.unitedegg.org/information/

pdf/PromarStudy.pdf.
n Poll: U.S. Citizens Support Humane Treatment for Egg-Laying Hens,

CNN.COM (Sept. 20, 2000, 8:52 AM), http://archives.cnn.com/2000/FOOD/news/
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2007 study funded by Oklahoma State University reported that 95%
of participants said they agreed with the statement "[i]t is important
to me that animals on farms are well cared for." 78
Such restrictive confinement of hens leads to eggs that
jeopardize human health. For example, all scientific studies in the last
five years have found that caged hens are more likely to transmit
Salmonella.79 Recently, a study reported in Preventative Veterinary
Medicine found that caged laying hens are twenty times more likely
to transmit Salmonella than cage-free hens.8 0 Eggs may be infected
with Salmonella Enteritis when they pass through infected hens'
oviducts8 1 or are exposed to Salmonella through the pores of the shell
after being laid.82 The Food Safety and Inspection Service reports
that Salmonella causes an estimated 1.3 million illnesses, 15,000
hospitalizations, and 500 deaths annually, and that eggs have been
found to be the source of approximately 80% of Salmonella
infections with a known source.8 3
Furthermore, eggs from caged hens contain lower nutrient
levels than eggs from hens that were not raised in cages.84 For
example, a recent study published in Renewable Agriculture and
Food Systems reported that eggs from pastured hens had higher
concentrations of omega-3 fat and vitamins A and E than eggs from
09/20/food.hens.reut/index.html.

Jayson L. Lusk et al., Consumer Preferences for Farm Animal Welfare:
Results of a Nationwide Telephone Survey, 14 (Dep't of Agric. Econ. Okla. Univ.,
78

Working Paper), availableat http://asp.okstate.edu/baileynorwood/Bailey/Research
/InitialReporttoAFB.pdf.
79
Food Safety and Cage Egg Production, THE HUMANE SOC'Y OF THE U.S., 2
(May 2001), http://www.humanesociety.org/assets/pdfs/farm/report-food_safety
eggsxdf.
Compassion Over Killing, Inc. et al., supra note 1, at 25 (citing S. Van
Horrebeke et al., Determination of the Within and Between Flock Prevalence and
Identification of Risk Factors for Salmonella Infections in Laying Hen Flocks
Housed in Conventional and Alternative Systems, 94 PREVENTATIVE VETERINARY
MED.

94 (2010)).

81 See

Karen Davis, The Battery Hen: Her Life Is Not For The Birds, UNITED

POULTRY CONCERNS,

http://www.upc-online.org/batthen.html (last visited Oct. 27,

2 See Fact Sheet: Egg Products Preparation,U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOOD
SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., http://www.fsis.usda.gov/factsheets/focus-on-shell-

eggs/index.asp#3 (last modified April 20, 2011).
83 Draft Risk Assessments for Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs and
Salmonella spp. in Liquid Egg Products, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOOD SAFETY &

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oppde/rdad/frpubs/04SERV.,
034n/introduction.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2011).
8 Compassion Over Killing, Inc. et al., supranote 1, at 25-28.
INSPECTION
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caged hens.85
III. CORRECTING THE INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
When a product is consistently misrepresented, the
government may ban the product or improve signaling about the
product's qualities.8 6 Improvements to quality signaling are usually
preferable because banning a product restricts both consumers and
producers.8 7 To improve quality signaling, a government may require
a producer to disclose truthful information, prohibit a producer from
providing misleading information by controlling voluntary
disclosures, provide public information about the product's quality,
or grant subsidies for the private provision of information. Such
remedies turn experience or credence attributes into search attributes,
because they permit consumers to evaluate a product's qualities
before purchase. 89 For example, the federal government requires
producers to disclose information about nutrient contents so
consumers know a food's fat content before buying that food.
However, neither having the government provide public information
nor pay private companies to provide public information is ideal
because these options are expensive. Thus, many government
interventions take the form of mandating disclosures or regulating
voluntary disclosures. 90
Although voluntary labeling systems may appear to be the
easiest solution to information asymmetries, there are problems with
Id. at 27 (citing Heather D. Karsten et al., Vitamins A, E and Fatty Acid
Composition of the Eggs of Caged Hens and Pastured Hens, 25 RENEWABLE
85

AGRIC. &FOOD SYS. 45 (2010)).
86

See Caswell & Mojduszka, Information Labeling, supra note 7, at 1251

(discussing bans and informational remedies as ways of addressing imperfect
information).
87 See id (stating that "[e]conomists have argued that if the government has the
choice between banning a risky product or activity and providing information about

the risks involved, it should choose information provision").
88

Id.

Id. at 1251-52.
90 To facilitate consumer education, many regulatory agencies require
producers and manufacturers to disclose product information. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §
1333 (2006) (requiring Surgeon General's warnings on tobacco products); 21
C.F.R. § 101.9 (2006) (requiring nutritional labeling on food products); 21 C.F.R. §
201.10 (requiring the listing of ingredient information on prescription drugs); 21
C.F.R. § 740.1 (requiring warning statements on some cosmetic products). Also, as
discussed supra Part II(B), the FDA mandates disclosure of use of irradiation, and
it determines whether claims such as "GMO free" or "rbST free" are misleading.
8
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foregoing federal labeling mandates. Studies indicate that voluntary
systems of labeling production method information on food products
do not remedy information asymmetries. For example, prior to the
implementation of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act in 1990,
producers provided information about nutrient contents in food
products on a voluntary basis. 91 As one study concluded,
"[i]ncentives for voluntary disclosure of nutritional content by food
processing companies did not generally result in reliable and
consistent quality signaling to consumers." 92 Further, although
University of California, Santa Cruz researchers recently found that
81% of respondents listed labels as their preferred source of
information about foods,9 3 only 2% of those who responded to a
Harris Interactive Poll were able to correctly identify the definition of
the term "natural" on meat and poultry.9 4 Such a significant
information failure suggests that some consumers may not be
selecting products that represent their food preferences.
Additionally, many consumers do not understand fundamental
aspects of our current methods of food production. As previously
mentioned, more than 70% of processed foods contain GM
ingredients.95 However, the Pew Initiative on Food and
Biotechnology found in 2003 that 58% of Americans believed they
had never eaten GM food. 96
Theoretically, if some eggs bear voluntary labels indicating an
added quality such as cage free production, the absence of. such a
label indicates that the added quality is not present. However, it is
unclear whether consumers do this calculation, or whether they are
often aware of the values of added qualities.
Despite these statistics, consumers typically do very little active
research on products they purchase, even when they are shopping for
expensive products.9 7 In deciding whether to research a product,
consumers use a cost-benefit analysis: research continues until the
value of an additional unit of information equals the cost of obtaining
91 Caswell & Mojduszka, Nutritional Quality, supra note 10, at 298.
92

Id. at 308.

9

ANIMAL WELFARE INST., CONSUMER PERCEPTIONS OF FARM ANIMAL

WELFARE 3 (Apr. 17, 2011), available at http://67.227.178.42/sites/default/files/
uploads/legacy-uploads/documents/FA-Consumerperceptionsoffarmwelfare5-011
010-1285950277-document-25066.pdf.
9 Id. at 4.
95 Streiffer & Rubel, supra note 50, at 66.
96

id.

See Howard Beales et al., Consumer Search and Public Policy, 8 J.
CONSUMER RES. 11, 11 (1981).
9
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that unit of information.98 Consumers have little incentive to continue
researching if they believe they already know about the important
aspects of a product. 99 However, consumers may not have accurate
concepts of the benefits to be gained by additional research.' 00 As one
scholar explained, "[i]nformation is a commodity the worth of which
can never be exactly known before purchase ... [so] a consumer who
sees little merit in gathering information may never discover that
more information would have been valuable." As applied to eggs,
many, if not most, consumers may not understand that differences in
methods of egg production often impact the nutritional qualities of
eggs, or that some eggs are more likely to carry Salmonella than
others, so they may never seek such information.
Opponents of mandatory labeling argue that some consumers
make irrational food selections based on labels because they lack
information or understanding, potentially lowering demand for food
produced by processes that are ultimately beneficial for society.102
For example, according to one researcher, "[i]rradiated foods are
required to be labeled . . . . Given the negative connotations

associated with the words 'radiation' and 'irradiation,' the labeling
requirement is viewed as an obstacle to consumer acceptance." 03
Economics assumes that the aggregation of consumer choices
makes the market more efficient than if control of the market comes
from a few individuals. If we trust in market forces for products, what
makes the market for food production different? As law professor
Douglas Kysar has noted, "[a]lthough proponents of the
process/product distinction tend to view manufacturing processes as
especially unreliable bases for consumer distinction, process
id
9 See id at 12.

98 See

100 See id. at 14 (stating that policy is difficult "where consumers have accurate
information about individual items, but inaccurate estimates of the variance in the
marketplace.").

'0 Id. at 17.
102 Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product

Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 526, 531

(2004) ("[P]roponents of the process/product distinction believe that withholding
process-based considerations from consumers helps to moderate market demand in

cases where unfettered consumer choice could lead to socially undesirable
outcomes. Such outcomes may occur either because individuals suffer from certain
informational and cognitive deficiencies that impair their ability to comprehend
process information accurately, or because interest groups have strong incentives to
exploit public perceptions of manufacturing processes for private purposes").
103John A. Fox, Influences on Purchaseof IrradiatedFoods, 52 FOOD TECH.

34,38 (2002).
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preferences on close examination appear to reflect coherent, wellgrounded consumer viewpoints, essentially indistinguishable from
other aspects of preference that have been regarded as unassailable
within the liberal market framework."' 04
Labeling a credence attribute may have positive effects on the
market. First, additional labeling may alter consumers' behavior,tos in
turn benefiting society. For example, consumers may opt for eggs
produced by methods that minimize their risk of contracting
Salmonella,potentially avoiding costly illnesses. Second, a change in
consumer preference (e.g., selecting free-range or cage-free eggs
because they are less likely to carry Salmonella) may encourage egg
producers to alter production methods to accommodate consumers'
preferences, resulting in an overall increase in food safety. 06
Eventually, if there is little to no market for the undesired attribute,
the required label may become unnecessary.1 0 7 Third, consumers may
like additional labeling even if the labeling does not influence their
purchasing decisions because labeling serves as an assurance that
government agencies are considering their interests. 0 8

IV. FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE ON COMMERCIAL SPEECH,
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment provides:
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of

speech." 09 However, as the U.S. Supreme Court established in 1919,
"[i]t is too plain for argument that a manufacturer or vendor has no
constitutional right to sell goods without giving to the purchaser fair
information of what it is that is being sold.""t0 Commercial speech is
entitled to less deference than other types of speech in the interest of
providing consumers with information that helps them correctly
identify the value of products and services.' As the Court has
explained, "[i]nformation is not in itself harmful [and] people will
'" Id. at 580.
105Caswell & Padberg, supra note 13, at 466.
106id
107 Id.

at 463.

'os Donna M. Byrne, Cloned Meat, Voluntary Food Labeling, and Organic
Oreos, 8 PIERCE L. REv. 31, 71 (2009); see also Caswell & Padberg, supranote 13,

at 465 (asserting that "[c]onsumers may value the presence of comprehensive
labeling independently of the value they place on labels as a direct shopping aid"
because labeling generates "consumer confidence in the food supply").
' U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The First Amendment applies to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. N.Y., 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
110 Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 431 (1919).
"' Id. at 431-32.

2011]

ProductionMethod Disclosureson Egg Cartons

297

perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough
informed.""I 2 Advocating the provision of information, the Court has
asserted that the "[d]isclosure of truthful, relevant information is
more likely to make a positive contribution to decision-making than
is concealment of such information."" 3
A government can restrict commercial speech only if the
restriction serves a substantial interest, furthers that substantial
interest, and is not more extensive than reasonably necessary.
Governments have been permitted to compel commercial speech in
the form of disclosures if there is a rational relationship between the
expression and a governmental interest, and the disclosure
requirement is neither unjustified nor unduly burdensome.114
A. Intermediate Scrutinyfor Restrictions on CommercialSpeech

The Court has explained that its "[g]eneral approach to
restrictions on commercial speech is also by now well settled."" 5
According to the Court, "[t]he States and the Federal Government are
free to prevent the dissemination of commercial speech that is false,
deceptive, or misleading, or that proposes an illegal transaction," but
"[c]ommercial speech that is not false or deceptive and does not
concern unlawful activities . . . may be restricted only in the service

of a substantial governmental interest, and only through a means that
directly advance[s] that interest.""'
The Court has consistently invalidated restrictions that
deprive consumers of accurate information about products and
services" 7 - the following cases establish that approach.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
" Peel v. Att'y Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 108
(1990). Focusing on the interests of the consumer, the Court specified that
"[c]ommercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but
also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible
dissemination of information." Id.; see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980).
114 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 638 (1985).
112

" Id. at 638.
116 Id. The Court has further clarified that "only false, deceptive, or misleading
commercial speech may be banned . . . . " Id. (citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S.
1, 9 (1979)), and that "[t]ruthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to
the protections of the First Amendment . . . . Misleading advertising may be
prohibited entirely." In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
117 See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977);
Bigelow v.
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1. CentralHudson (1980)
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public
Service Commission of New York, the issue presented to the Court

was whether the Public Commission of New York could ban
promotional advertising by Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., an
electrical utility company. The Commission had found that "the
interconnected utility system in New York State [did] not have
sufficient fuel stocks or sources of supply to continue furnishing all
customer demands for the 1973-1974 winter" and ordered electric
utilities companies in the state to cease all advertising that
"promot[ed] the use of electricity.""' 9 In defense of its ban, the
Commission asserted that promotional advertising encouraging the
increased use of electricity was contrary to the national policy of
conserving energy, and therefore that the ban was a vehicle for
conservation.1 20
Because the ban on promotional advertising was complete, it
prohibited Central Hudson from.marketing "off-peak" use, although
the Commission did permit Central Hudson to target "informational"
advertising to encourage shifts of consumption from peak to off-peak
hours.121 According to the Commission, promotional advertising for
use during off-peak hours would appear to encourage additional
energy consumption.122 The Commission asserted. that additional
energy use would aggravate economic inequities,123 explaining that
although only certain consumers would increase energy consumption
in response to the advertisements, all consumers would subsidize the
increased consumption in the form of rate increases.1 24
To evaluate the Commission's suppression of commercial
speech, the Court developed a four-part analysis.125 Under the fourpart analysis, the first question is whether the speech at issue deserves
First Amendment protection. As the Court explained, First
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Va.
Stiate Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 748, 772
(1976).
11 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 558-59.

"9 Id. at 558.
120

Id. at 559.

121 Id.

at 559--60.
560.

122 Id. at
123

Id. at 568-69.
565.
566.

124 Id. at
125 Id. at

ProductionMethod Disclosures on Egg Cartons

2011]

299

Amendment protection is appropriate when commercial speech is
both concerned with lawful activity and is not misleading.126 The
second question is whether the governmental interest asserted as the
justification for the regulation of the protected commercial speech is
substantial.127 If the commercial speech is deserving of First
Amendment protection and the governmental interest in regulation is
substantial, a court proceeds to the third and fourth parts of its
analysis, under which it asks whether the regulation directly advances
the governmental interest asserted, and whether the regulation is not
more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.12s
In Central Hudson, the Court held that the Commission's ban
on advertising was unconstitutional. The Court found that the first
three elements of the analysis were met: Central Hudson's
promotional advertising was worthy of First Amendment
protection;1 29 the state's interest 0 in energy conservation was a
substantial governmental interest;13 and the state's interest in energy
conservation was directly advanced by the ban on promotional
advertising, because there is a direct link between advertising and
13 However, when it proceeded to the fourth part of its
consumption.a
analysis, the Court decided that because the Commission's ban
reached all promotional advertising, including "information about
electric devices or services that would cause no net increase in total
energy use," the Commission. had failed to show that a more limited
restriction on Central Hudson's promotional advertising would not
serve the state's interest in energy conservation.132 Tilus, the Court
concluded that the Commission's ban was unconstitutional.133
2. Boardof Trustees (1989)

In 1989, the Supreme Court reviewed its holding in Central
Id.; see also id, at 563-64 (discussing the origin of the Central Hudson
analysis).
16

127 Id. at 566.
128
129

id
Id. at 566-68.

Id. at 568-69. The Court declined to apply the full four-part analysis to the
Commission's asserted interest in fair utility rates because it noted that, while
"laudable," the Commission's concern about the equity of Central Hudson's rates
was "highly tenuous" and therefore could not justify the "silencing" of the
promotional advertising. Id. at 569.
131 Id. The Court observed that "Central Hudson would not contest the
advertising ban unless it believed that promotion would increase its sales." Id.
132 Id. at 570.
130

133

id
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Hudson in Board of Trustees of State University of New York v. Fox,

elaborating upon the application of the Central Hudson test for
restrictions on commercial speech. 134 The issue in Board of Trustees
was whether the University could limit the operation of private
commercial enterprises on the campus.135 In discussing Central
Hudson's four-part analysis, the Court observed that it could be
construed as a least restrictive means test, therefore requiring that the
manner of restriction be absolutely the least severe that will achieve
its desired end.136 However, the Court asserted that "other
formulations of [its] commercial speech cases support[ed] a more
flexible reading of the CentralHudson test."' 3 7
In particular, the Court noted that it had previously concluded
that restrictions intended to prevent deceptive advertising must be
"narrowly tailored" and "no more extensive than reasonably
necessary to further substantial interests."138 The Court observed that
imposing a least restrictive means test on government disclQsure
requirements would place a heavy burden on states, which is at odds
with granting commercial speech only a limited measure of
protection.139 In fully explaining its position on the test, the Court
stated:
[W]e have not gone so far as to impose upon [regulators]

the burden of demonstrating that . . . the manner of

restriction is absolutely the least severe that will achieve
the desired end. What our decisions require is a [fit
between ends and means] .. . that is not necessarily perfect,

but reasonable . . . . Within those bounds we leave it to

governmental decision makers to judge what manner of
regulation may best be employed. 14
Thus, the Court softened the effect of the test it had outlined
in CentralHudson. However, adding to its explanation of the Central
Hudson test, the Court, in Edenfield v. Fane in 1993, further noted
that "a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on
commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real
and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material
14Bd.

of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 469 (1989).

15Id.

Id. at 476.
31 Id. at 477.
138 Id. (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191,
203, 207 (1982)).
136

13

Id.

'4 Id. at 480.
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degree."l41 The Court explained in Ibanez in 1994 that in the interest
of retaining the protections afforded commercial speech, "we cannot
allow rote invocation of the words 'potentially misleading' to
supplant the . . . burden to 'demonstrate that the harms . . . recite[d]

that . .. restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material
are real and
42

degree."'l

B. RationalBasisfor Restrictions on CommercialSpeech

According to the Court, "[t]he mere fact that messages
propose commercial transactions does not in and of itself dictate the
constitutional analysis that should apply to decisions to suppress
them."l 43 The Court clarified its constitutional analysis of compelled
commercial speech by explaining that "[w]hen a State regulates
commercial messages to protect consumers from misleading,
deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or requires the disclosure of
beneficial consumer information, the purpose of its regulation is
consistent with the reasons for according constitutional protection to
commercial speech and therefore justifies less than strict review."'"
The Court has explained that a state may require commercial
messages to "appear in such a form, or include such additional
information, warnings and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent
and restrict aggressive forms of advertisin
its being deceptive,"
that have the potential to exert "undue influence" over consumers.
The Court has maintained that the greater "objectivity" of
commercial speech justifies allowing a state to distinguish false or
misleading commercial advertisements from those that are true.147
Thus, "[w]hen a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of
truthful, non-misleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated
to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less
reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment
generally demands."1 48 The Court applied this doctrine in Zauderer
141 Edenifield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993). The Court further stated
that the regulation must advance a substantial state interest in a "direct and material
way" and be in "reasonable proportion to the interests served." Id. at 767.
142 Ibanez v. Fl. Dep't of Business & Professional Regulation, Bd. of
Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994).
143 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996).
144 id.
14s Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S.748, 772 (1976).
'1 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 366 (1977).
147 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 771.

148

id.
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and Milavetz, the two leading Supreme Court cases on compelled
commercial speech.
1. Zauderer(1980)
In Zauderer v. Supreme Court of Ohio, the Supreme Court

considered whether a restriction on appellant's newspaper
advertisement was consistent with the First Amendment.14 The
advertisement announced Zauderer's willingness to represent women
who had injuries resulting from the use of a contraceptive known as
the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device. 50 In his ad, Zauderer stated
that Dalkon cases "are handled on a contingency fee basis" and
reassured potential clients that "[i]f there is no recovery, no legal fees
are owed by our clients."' 5
An Ohio disciplinary rule required that an ad mentioning a
contingent-fee basis for rates "[d]isclos[e] whether percentages are
computed before or after deduction of court costs and expenses."l52
Ohio required this statement so potential clients would be aware that,
although they would owe no legal fees to a lawyer if their cases were
unsuccessful, they might still be liable for court costs.153 Zauderer did
not include that disclosure in his ads, and the Supreme Court of
Ohio's Office of Disciplinary Counsel alleged that this omission was
deceptive. 1
On review, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that there is no
doubt as to whether commercial speech is deserving of First
Amendment protection, even if that protection is less than the level of
protection afforded other types of speech. 55 The Court noted that it
was not certain of the precise bounds of the category of commercial
speech, but that Zauderer's ads, "advertising - pure and simple,"
were clearly commercial speech. 5 6
Having decided the disclosure was commercial speech, the
Court considered Ohio's requirement that Zauderer provide a
disclosure explaining the costs associated with a contingent-fee

'4 Zauderer v. Office of Discipinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 630, 637-53 (1985).
I5o 1d. at 630.

.sId. at 631.
i 2 Id. at 633.
Id.
Id. at 633-34.
'" Id. at 637.
15 id.
'5
154
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arrangement on his advertisements was constitutional.'" In its
discussion, the Court first observed that there are "material
differences between disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions
on speech."' 58 It further explained, "all our discussions of restraints
on commercial speech have recommended disclosure requirements as
one of the acceptable less restrictive alternatives to actual suppression
of speech."159 The Court noted that the extension of First Amendment
protections to commercial speech is valuable primarily because of the
information such speech provides to consumers.16'0 The Court further
stated that requiring disclosures infringes on an advertiser's interests
much less than a prohibition on speech.' 6 ' As a result of consumers'
interests in product information, an advertiser's "constitutionally
protected interest in not providing any particular factual information
in his advertising is minimal." 6 2 The Court then went on to note that
"unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements" might be
unconstitutional.16 3 The Court clarified its position by providing a
reasonably related test for the compelled disclosure of commercial
speech: "An advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as
disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest
in preventing deception of consumers."'64 According to the Court,
"[t]he right of a commercial speaker not to divulge accurate
information regarding his services is not . .. a fundamental right."16 5
1s7 Id. In Zauderer, a second issue was whether Ohio could discipline Zauderer
for soliciting business by running an advertisement containing an illustration and
legal advice. Id. at 629. Ohio Disciplinary Rules prohibit the use of illustrations in
attorney advertisements and accepting employment resulting from unsolicited
advice to a layman that the layman should obtain counsel or take legal action,
among other things. Id. at 632-33. Zauderer's advertisement included a line
drawing of the Dalkon Shield, and explained the alleged dangers of the Shield,
stating "[i]f you or a friend have had a similar experience do not assume it is too
late to take legal action against the Shield's manufacturer" and "[o]ur law firm is
presently representing women on such cases." Id. at 630-31. The Court concluded
that neither Zauderer's illustration nor solicitation of business was false, misleading
or deceptive, and held that Ohio could not prohibit Zauderer from including those
elements in his advertisements because Ohio had failed to show that it could not
combat the potential abuses of those elements by means short of a ban. Id. at 64647, 649.
1

Id. at 650.

" Id. at 651.
6 Id.
61
id.
162

id.

163 id
164id.
11I.at 65 1.
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In arriving at this test, the Court explicitly stated that a least
restrictive means analysis derived from Central Hudson would not
have been appropriately applied to this situation.16 6 Explaining its
choice, the Court stated, "Although we have subjected outright
prohibitions on speech to [the Central Hudson] analysis, all our
discussions of restraints on commercial speech have recommended
disclosure requirements as one of the acceptable less restrictive
alternatives to actual suppression of speech."' 7 The Court observed
that the test it was outlining did not require that there be no other
means for the state to achieve its objective, or that the mandated
disclosure get at all the facets of the problem the state is
addressing.
The Court concluded that Ohio's disclosure requirement was
reasonably related to its interest in preventing the deception of legal
clients because "[t]he assumption that substantial numbers of
potential clients would be . . . misled [was] hardly a speculative

one."169 The Court concluded that it was not unduly burdensome to
require an attorney to disclose in his advertisements of a contingentfee arrangement that the potential client might be liable for court
costs even if the lawsuit was unsuccessful.' Therefore, the Court
held that Ohio's disclosure requirement was a constitutionally
permissible form of compelled commercial speech.17 '
2. Milavetz (2010)

The circumstances in Milavetz, were similar to those in
Zauderer: both cases required disclosures to correct highly
misleading commercial advertisements concerning professional
services.A In Milavetz, the question was whether a disclosure
required by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA") was permissible.173 The
BAPCPA required Milavetz, a debt relief agency, to disclose in its
advertisements of debt relief services that those services might
166 Id. at

16 7 Id.

651 n.14.

' Id. at 652.
Id. at 652 n.15.

170

17'Id. at 652. The Court observed that Ohio's disclosure requirement "easily
passe[d] muster" under this test. Id.
172 See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., v. U.S., 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1329

(2010); see also Zauderer,471 U.S. at 630.
'7 Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1329.
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involve bankruptcy relief. 174 The BAPCPA also required Milavetz to
identify itself as a debt relief agency,' 7 5 in order to correct a possible
public assumption that an agency: was offering debt relief services
that did not involve filing for bankruptcy, which has inherent costs.176
The BAPCPA did not prevent debt agencies from providing
additional information of their choosing.' 77
After identifying the affected speech as commercial the Court
sought to determine the applicable standard of scrutiny.M Milavetz
argued that the Court should choose the intermediate level of scrutiny
applied to non-misleading commercial speech under the Central
Hudson analysis.17 9 The Government maintained that, on the
contrary, the challenged disclosure requirement was directed at
misleading speech, asserting that the Court should thus apply the
reasonably related test articulated in Zauderer.80
Milavetz contended that the Government had not produced
evidence that the advertisements were misleading.'8 1 However, the
Court held that because deception was self-evident, the Government
did not need to collect evidence before determining that it was
misleading. 182 The Court opted to apply Zaudererrather than Central
Hudson on the basis that Zauderer's advertisement was "misleading
commercial speech" absent the disclosure.' 83 The Court noted that the
challenged provision shared essential features with the rule at issue in
Zauderer.84 According to the Court, both disclosures were intended
to reconcile the problem of inherently misleading commercial
advertisements by requiring only an accurate statement without
limiting the conveyance of additional information.' The Court also
opined that evidence in the CongressionalRecord demonstrating the
likelihood of consumer confusion resulting from advertisements such
as Milavetz's was "adequate to establish that the likelihood of
Id. at 1330.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 1340.
1

177 See id.
17s id.

179 Id. at 1339.
180 Id.; see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio,
471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (stating that "an advertiser's rights are adequately
protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's
interest in preventing deception of consumers.").
' Milavetz, 130 S. Ct.. at 1340.
182id.
18

Id. at 1339.

' Id. at 1340.

185 id
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deception in this case 'is hardly a speculative one"' and implied that
the possibility of deception is "self-evident," as it was in Zauderer.'16
In deciding whether to apply Central Hudson, the Court
observed that advertisements for professional services present a
particular risk of deception. 18 Quoting Zauderer,the Court held that
the BAPCPA's disclosure requirement mandating the advertiser to
disclose its identity as a debt relief agency and that its services might
involve bankruptcy relief was "reasonably related to the
[Govemment's] interest in preventing deception of consumers." 88 In
reference to Zauderer's requirement that the compulsion of
commercial speech not be unjustified or unduly burdensome, the
Court concluded that an advertiser's rights are sufficiently protected
if the disclosure requirement is reasonably related to the
government's interest.1
3. Cases in Other Federal Courts (2001-2011)
Numerous federal cases have interpreted Zauderer to apply
where the compulsion of speech is reasonably related to the
government's interest.190 For example, in 2001, the Second Circuit
186

[d.

187 d
188 Id. at 134.
189 Id. at

1339-40.

19 See Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d. Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 536 U.S. 905 (2002); see also Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass'n v. Rowe, 429
F.3d 294, 310 (1st Cir. 2005); Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d
Cir. 1996). In Amestoy, the Second Circuit applied CentralHudson's four-part test
to a commercial disclosure requirement. Id. at 72. The dairy manufacturers
challenged the constitutionality of a Vermont law requiring milk producers to label
products from cows that were treated with an artificial growth hormone, rBST
(recombinant Bovine Somatotropin), which increases cows' milk production. Id. at
69. Vermont defended the statute by pointing to a strong consumer interest in
knowing whether dairy products come from cows treated with rBST and claiming a
public "right to know." Id. at 73. The court observed that the district court had
plainly stated, "Vermont t[ook] no position on whether rBST is beneficial or
detrimental," and that Vermont's only expressed interest was "consumer curiosity."
Id. at 73 n. 1. According to the Economic Impact Statement Vermont prepared to
assess its statute, consumer interest in the disclosure of rBST use was based on
concerns about human health and safety impacts from recombinant gene
technology, worry over the hormone's impact on bovine health, and fears that
surplus milk made possible by the technology would have a negative impact on
Vermont's dairy industry. Id. at 75. The Second Circuit noted that Vermont had not
taken a position on whether rBST was beneficial or detrimental. Id. at 73 n.1.
According to the court, Vermont identified consumer concern about treating dairy
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upheld a state law requiring manufacturers of products containing
mercury to disclose information about product disposal. The court
concluded that the disclosure requirement was reasonably related to
the state's interest in preventing mercury contamination." Similarly,
in 2003, the Ninth Circuit upheld a statute requiring sewer providers
to educate the public about hazards of improper waste disposal as
constitutional, because it found that the purpose of the statute was
consistent with the goals of the Clean Water Act.192 In 2009, the
Second Circuit decided that it was constitutional for New York to
require restaurants to post information about caloric intake because
this requirement was reasonably related to New York's interest in
reducing obesity.'9 3 In 2010, the Sixth Circuit held that it was
cows with artificial hormones but did not itself claim to have this concern. Id. The
court thus concluded that Vermont "fail[ed] to defend its constitutional intrusion on
the ground that [treating dairy cows with rBST] negatively impacts public health."
Id. at 73.
'9' See Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 115. In Sorrell, the issue was whether Vermont's

requirement that produceis of some products containing mercury label their
products as such and include disposal instructions on the product was permissible.
Id at 107. The requirement applied to the National Electrical Manufacturers
Association's (NEMA) lamps. Id. NEMA conceded that only commercial speech
was at issue here. Id. at 113. The court observed that "[c]ommercial disclosure
requirements are treated differently from restrictions on commercial speech
because mandated disclosure of accurate, factual, commercial information does not
offend the core First Amendment values of promoting efficient exchange of
information or protecting individual liberty interests." Id. at 113-14. The court
noted that compelled commercial speech is entitled to limited First Amendment
protection as long as disclosure pertains to factual statements rather than opinions.
Id. at 114, n. 5. The court then summarized its position on compelled commercial
speech by noting that "mandating that commercial actors disclose commercial
information ordinarily does not offend the important utilitarian and individual
liberty interests that lie at the heart of the First Amendment." Id at 114-15. It
concluded that Zauderer's rational basis test applies where commercial speech is
compelled and Central Hudson's four-part analysis applies where commercial
speech is restricted.Id. at 115. The Second Circuit thus concluded that Vermont's
disclosure requirement was reasonably related to its interest in reducing mercury
contamination. Id.
192 See Envtl. Defense Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 849 (9th Cir. 2003).
"' N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 118 (2d
Cir. 2009). In New York State Restaurant Association v. New York City Board of

Health, the First Amendment question was whether New York City could require
restaurants to post information about caloric contents on their menus and menu
boards. Id. The Second Circuit asserted that caloric information on message boards
and menus in restaurants is information connected to a proposed commercial
transaction and is therefore commercial speech. Id. at 131. The court noted that
"regulations that compel 'purely factual and uncontroversial' commercial speech
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constitutional for the Ohio Department of Agriculture to require milk
producers who advertised the nonuse of a growth hormone to include
a disclaimer.194 The disclaimer noted that the Food and Drug
are subject to more lenient review than regulations that restrict accurate commercial
speech. Id. at 132 (internal citation omitted). In reviewing its 2001 decision in
Sorrell to apply Zauderer where it permitted the compelled disclosure of mercury
in products, the court explained that that decision did not address consumer
confusion or deception "per se," but rather focused on informing consumers about
mercury used in a variety of projects. Id. at 133. The court noted that the goal of
informing consumers about the presence of mercury was not inconsistent with the
policies behind First Amendment protections for commercial speech. Id. Thus, it
proceeded to a rational basis test. Id. The court asserted that "New York City ha[d]
plainly demonstrated a reasonable relationship between the purpose [of the
regulation] . . . and the means employed to achieve that purpose." Id. at 134. The

court then concluded that New York City had shown that its disclosure requirement
was reasonably related to the City's interest in reducing obesity. N. Y St. Restaurant
Assn., 556 F.3d at 135. Interestingly, the court did not opine as to whether New
York City's disclosure requirement was reasonably related to its stated goal of
reducing consumer confusion and deception. See id at 134 (listing New York
City's goals as (1) reduc[ing] consumer confusion and deception; and (2) . . .
promot[ing] consumer decision-making so as to reduce obesity and the diseases
associated with it"); id. at 135 (identifying New York City's goal of reducing
obesity as reasonably related to its regulation but declining to discuss the City's
goal of reducing consumer confusion and deception).
194 Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 650 (6th Cir. 2010). In
International Dairy Foods Association v. Boggs, the question pertinent to a

discussion of compelled tommercial speech was whether the Ohio Department of
Agriculture (ODA) could mandate that milk producers who advertised their nonuse
of artificial growth hormones include a disclaimer on their products stating that
"[t]he FDA has determined that no significant difference has been shown between
milk derived from rbRT-supplemented and non-rbST-supplemented cows." Id. at
634. The FDA had previously issued a Guidance determining that milk producers
could voluntarily label their products with statements such as "from cows not
treated with rbST," however the agency had cautioned that such labels had the
potential to be "false and misleading" because they provided the potential for
consumers to mistakenly believe that milk from untreated cows is of a higher
quality or is safer. Id. at 632-33. In analyzing the ODA's disclosure requirement,
the Sixth Circuit cited Milavetz as establishing that Zauderer's "reasonably related"
test applies where a disclosure requirement targets speech that is "inherently
misleading," concluding that Zauderer also applies where commercial speech is
"potentiallymisleading." Id. at 641 (emphases in original). The court explained that
it arrived at this conclusion for two reasons. First, it observed, "in Milavetz, the
Court did not explicitly limit its application of Zauderer to inherently misleading
speech, instead stating that a relaxed standard of review applies to disclosure
requirements regulating 'misleading commercial speech."' Id, (emphasis in
original). Second, the Sixth Circuit reiterated the Supreme Court's recognition that
an advertiser's "'constitutionally protected interest in not providing the required
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Administration found no significant difference between milk from
cows treated with a hormone and milk from cows not treated.195 The
court asserted this requirement was constitutional because it was
reasonably related to the state's interest in preventing consumer
deception. In 2011, the Western District of Washington upheld an
ordinance requiring yellow pages vendors to include a statement on
the cover of the yellow pages directories and on their websites that
Seattle residents could opt out of receiving the phone books, because
the city had an interest in allowing residents to reject unwanted
yellow pages directories. 197
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF COMPELLING
PRODUCTION METHOD LABELING ON EGGS
Disclosures on foods are a method of proposing a commercial
transaction, so they are commercial speech. As commercial speech,
disclosures on food are entitled to First Amendment protection,
although less than that granted to noncommercial forms of speech.
The three-tiered system of disclosures on eggs, which includes the
labels Free-Range Eggs, Cage-Free Eggs, and Eggs from Caged
Hens, is likely constitutional because, following Zauderer, such
factual information is minimal,"' reasoning that the interest in avoiding disclosure,
and thus the propriety of compelling disclosure, would adhere "regardless of
whether the speech being targeted is inherently or potentially misleading." Id.
(emphasis in original). The court concluded that Zauderer applies when a
disclosure requirement addresses potentially misleading speech, observing that a
statement such as "from cows not treated with rbST" is potentially misleading
because it may imply that. milk from cows treated with artificial growth hormones
is inferior or less safe. Id. at 642. It then applied Zauderer's "reasonably related"
test and held that "the Rule's disclosure requirement is reasonably related to the
State's interest in preventing consumers from being deceived by production
claims." Id. The court noted that a government's burden of providing evidence that
a production claim is misleading is relaxed where disclosure statements are at issue,
explaining that "[a]lthough the FDA's. Interim Guidance and the consumer
comments relied on by the State constitute weak evidence of deception, they at
least demonstrate that the risk of deception in this case is not speculative." Id. The
Sixth Circuit further explained that "[a]t a minimum, the Guidance supports the
conclusion that production claims can be misleading and the comments show that
there is general confusion among some Ohio consumers regarding what substances
are (or are not) in the milk they purchase," which sets a very low threshold for
determining whether an expression is potentially misleading. Id.
' Id. at 632.
9 Id. at 642.
19 Dex Media

W., Inc. v. City of Seattle, No. C1O-1857JLR, 2011 WL
2559391, at *10-11 (W.D. Wash. June 28, 2011).
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disclosures are rationally related to governmental interests in
facilitating the selection of nutritious food that is expected to be free
of food borne pathogens. The three-tiered disclosure system is not
unjustified or unduly burdensome.
A. Are Disclosureson Foods Speech?

Because labeling on food proposes a commercial transaction,
inviting purchase, courts are almost certain to decide that labeling on
food is commercial speech. For example, the Second Circuit analyzed
a mandated disclosure of caloric content on menus as commercial
speech in 2009.198
B. Are Disclosures on Foods CommercialSpeech?

Under a First Amendment analysis, the second issue to consider
is whether disclosures on foods are commercial speech. 199 Although
commercial speech is not beyond the scope of First Amendment
protection,200 the Supreme Court has noted that "[tihe Constitution
affords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression." 201 However, despite the
constitutional significance of determining whether speech is
commercial, there is no clear test: the Court has stated that the
"precise bounds" of commercial speech are "subject to doubt." 202 But
even without a clear test, food labels likely qualify as commercial
speech because they propose a commercial transaction. 203 Like other
claims found on food products, disclosures inform consumers and
thus influence their purchasing choices. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit
analyzed a disclosure on a food as commercial speech as recently as

19'N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 135 (2d
Cir. 2009) ("As commercial speech is speech that proposes a commercial
transaction, and Regulation 81.50 'requires disclosure of calorie information in
connection with a proposed commercial transaction-the sale of a restaurant meal,'
the form of speech affected by Regulation 81.50 is clearly commercial speech.").
' Zauderer v. Office of Discipinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 637 (1985).
200 See e.g. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commn., 165 F.3d 692, 709
(9th Cir. 1999).
201 U.S. v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993).
202

Zauderer,471 U.S. at 637.

203 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (identifying speech as commercial speech if it "does no more
than propose a commercial transaction").
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C. Constitutionalityof the Three-TieredDisclosureSystem

The Court has not yet squarely addressed the question of
whether Central Hudson or Zauderer applies to

compelled

If the three-tiered disclosure system is
commercial speech.
scrutinized under Zauderer's rational basis test, it will probably be
found constitutional, because the disclosures are reasonably related to
the government's interest in preventing deception of consumers.
Moreover, the proposed disclosures are reasonably related to the
government's interest in allowing consumers to reliably select food
products that have superior health qualities and are less likely to
make them sick than other similar food products.
205

1. Analyzing Compelled Commercial Speech
In Zauderer, the Court determined that a disclosure
requirement must be reasonably related to a governmental interest
and must not be unjustified or unduly burdensome. 206 Zauderer's
rational basis test is considerably easier to meet than Central
Hudson 's test, which amounts to an intermediate level of scrutiny. 2 07
The Court's decision in Milavetz to apply Zauderer'srational
basis test to the compelled disclosure of commercial speech 208
suggests that while Central Hudson applies to cases of restricted
See Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 635 (6th Cir. 2010).
See Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996)
(concluding that "[a]bsent. . . some indication that this information [about rBGH
treatment] bears on a reasonable concern for human health or safety or some other
sufficiently substantial governmental concern, the manufacturers cannot be
compelled to disclose it," and that consumer curiosity is not a substantial
governmental interest sufficient to justify compelled commercial speech); but see
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. U.S., 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339 (2010) (stating
that "[e]vidence in the congressional record demonstrating a pattern of
advertisements that hold out the promise of debt relief without alerting consumers
to its potential cost is adequate to establish that the likelihood of deception is this
case 'is hardly a speculative one.'); see also Boggs, 622 F.3d at 632, 641
(concluding that Zauderer's rational basis test applies where speech is 'potentially
misleading" (emphasis in original)); Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d
104, 115 (2d. Cir. 2001) (concluding that Zauderer's rational basis test applies
where commercial speech is compelled and Central Hudson's four-part analysis
applies where commercial speech is restricted).
206 Zauderer,471 U.S. at 651.
207
See suprapt. IV.B.2.
204
205

208 Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1339.
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commercial speech, Zauderer applies to cases of compelled
commercial speech. Indeed, the Second Circuit has recently stated
exactly this. 0 However, it is not clear whether Milavetz 's
application of Zauderer is limited just to commercial speech that is
"inherently misleading"210 or has the "self-evident possibility of
deception," 211 which are fairly high standards, or is applicable to all
compelled commercial speech.
In Milavetz, the Court concluded that the challenged provision
was "directed at misleading commercial speech."212 Most recently,
the Second Circuit identified Milavetz, and thus Zauderer, as
applying to speech that is either inherently or potentially
misleading. 2 13 It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will
extend the rational basis test to compelled commercial speech
remedying speech that is potentially, rather than inherently,
misleading, or to speech that is neither inherently nor potentially
misleading but is reasonably related to a governmental interest.
If Zauderer applies only where speech is inherently or selfevidently misleading, Central Hudson, applies to disclosure
requirements correcting commercial speech that is less than
inherently misleading (e.g., perhaps only potentially or possibly
misleading). However, as discussed supra, many lower federal courts
have used the rational basis test articulated in Zauderer where
disclosures are intended to address social problems, rather than
inherently misleading language. 2 14 Government interests ranging
from preventing mercury contamination 215 and combating obesity 21 ,
to providing consumers with a program allowing them to opt out
from deliveries of yellow pages directories have received judicial
approva. 217
209

Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 115 n.6. The court was distancing itself from

InternationalDairy Foods Association v. Amestoy, which was a 1996 decision to

apply Central Hudson to compelled commercial speech to the facts of that case,
and in particular only to situations where the government's alleged interest is in
"consumer curiosity." 92 F.3d 67 (1996).
210 Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1340.
2 Id. (quoting Zauderer,471 U.S. at 652-53).
212
Id. at 1339.
213 See Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 641 (6th Cir.
2010).
214 See supra pt. V(B)(3) (discussing cases that examined
compelled
commercial speech between 2000 and 2011).
215 Nat'1 Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d.
Cir. 2001).
2 16
N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 136 (2d
Cir. 2009).
217 See Dex Media W., Inc. v. City of Seattle, No. C1O-1857JLR,
2011 WL
2559391, at *10-11 (W.D. Wash. June 28, 2011).
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As Zauderer stated, the Supreme Court rejected the
contention that it should subject the disclosure requirements to a strict
"least restrictive means" analysis. The Court explained in Zauderer
that while it had submitted prohibitions on speech to such an analysis,
that similar to Central Hudson, "all [its] discussions of restraints on
commercial speech have recommended disclosure requirements as
one of the acceptable less restrictive alternatives to actual suppression
of speech." 2 18 Given this Supreme Court precedent, it is unlikely that
the Court would so limit Zauderer as to apply its rational basis test
only to inherently misleading speech.
2. Three-Tiered Disclosures on Eggs Are Probably Constitutional
Despite the uncertainties presently surrounding the
commercial speech doctrine, courts will likely apply Zauderer to
instances of compelled commercial speech until the Supreme Court
speaks on the issue, based on the precedent of Milavetz and Zauderer.
Furthermore, no Supreme Court case has applied CentralHudson to
an example of compelled commercial speech.
If a court applies the test in Zauderer, it will probably find
that there is a rational basis for the Food and Drug Administration to
have an interest in requiring the disclosure of production methods on
eggs. This is so because some current labeling implies that eggs are
produced on traditional farms, rather than in battery cages, which is
misleading. In addition to resolving this confusion, the three-tiered
disclosures would allow consumers to select eggs with superior
nutrient contents, and eggs less likely to expose them to Salmonella
Enteritis.

First, under Zauderer, compelling a production method
disclosure on eggs would likely be constitutional. Egg producers
provide graphic and textual references making it difficult for
consumers to tell whether the eggs are from caged hens,219 so there is
a rational basis for the FDA's interest in addressing misleading
advertising. For example, the petition discussed supra asserts that
eggs from caged hens bear labels such as "Animal Friendly" and
from "happy chickens" that are "gently cared for." 220 Other eggs
from caged hens are labeled as "naturally raised," "natural," or "farm
fresh." 2 Such claims imply that those eggs are from hens that lived
218 Zauderer v. Office of Discipinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985).
219 See Compassion Over Killing, Inc. et al., supra note 1, at 5, 11-17.
2o Id. at 11.
221 Id. at 12-13.
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in a natural environment. However, it is misleading to imply that
tiered wire cages wherein each hen has the space evivalent to an
8.5" x 11" piece of paper are "natural" environments.
As compared to Zauderer and Milavetz, which involved
commercial expressions that were implicitly misleading, claims such
as "naturally raised" are more directly misleading. Undoubtedly,
most consumers would not find tiny wire battery cages to be natural.
Furthermore, and as noted earlier, only 2% of those who responded to
a Harris Interactive Poll were. able to correctly identify the definition
of the term natural on meat and poultry, so it is unlikely that
consumers know enough about this assertion to discover the
inaccuracy. Similar to Zaudererand Milavetz, other terms on eggs are
misleading because they imply production method qualities of the
commodity, such as access to the outdoors, that do not exist.
The Supreme Court concluded in both Zauderer and Milavetz
that commercial speech can be deceiving despite the fact that the
information necessary to remedy the deception is available to
consumers. 224 Thus, consistent with Zauderer and Milavetz, although
it is possible for consumers to do research to uncover the conditions
that are typical within battery cage systems, advertisers must provide
commercial speech that does not create misunderstandings rather than
obligating consumers to research statements.
In Zauderer, the advertisement stated, "[i]f there is no
recovery, no legal fees are owed by our clients." 5 In Zauderer,what
was "self-evident" was the "possibility of deception" rather than
actual deception.226 The Supreme Court identified the possibility of

deception resulting from the advertisement as "self-evident," because
other costs could be involved even if no legal fees were assessed.2 2 7
Thus, the possibility of deception arose as a result of an
implication - that the client would owe no fees - rather than an

untruth - strictly speaking, Zauderer's assertion would have been
correct.228 For example, clients with a legal background would have
understood from Zauderer's advertisement that, when initiating a
lawsuit, not paying legal fees does not mean that one would not incur
cost. However, most of Zauderer's potential clients were unlikely to
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. U.S., 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1340 (2010)
(quoting Zauderer,471 U.S. at 652-53).
223 See ANIMAL WELFARE INST., supranote 93,
at 4.
471 U.S. at 652-53.
224
225 See Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1340; see also Zauderer,
Zauderer,471 U.S. at 652.
226
Id. at 652-53.
222

7 id.

22

228 Id. at 63 3.
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anticipate such a technical distinction between terms. Thus, in the
arena of disclosure requirements, "self-evident" deception results
from a combination of inclusions and omissions that are relevant to a
consumer's selection of a product or service.
Following Zauderer, disclosure requirements are appropriate
where many or most consumers would fail to grasp the subtleties of
terminology. This is true even though consumers could discover the
distinction if they do sufficient research. The burden to provide
information that would be accurately perceived was on Zauderer, in
the form of a disclosure, rather than on the consumer, who could have
done research but was unlikely either to have actually done so or to
have anticipated that such research would be necessary.
In Milavetz, it was arguably even less clear that the
advertisement would deceive consumers. As discussed supra, the
question in Milavetz was whether advertising bankruptcy services
without identifying oneself as a "debt relief agency" would deceive
consumers by implying that the cost of bankruptcy services- would
not involve the cost of filing for bankruptcy. 229 The Court concluded
that Milavetz' advertisement was inherently misleading. 23 o As in
Zauderer3 only the potential for deception was necessary in
Milavetz. 1 Although some consumers would be deceived, others
would understand the distinction between terms and anticipate that
bankruptcy services might involve filing for bankruptcy.
Additionally, while relatively minimal research into Milavetz's firm
or the practices involved in addressing bankruptcy could have
remedied any potential deception, the Court placed the burden to
clarify the advertisement's offering on the advertiser rather than the
consumer.232 Consumer confusion resulting from current egg labeling
is analogous to that of potential clients who could not anticipate
differences between types of assistance with bankruptcy, the issue the
229

See Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1330, 1340 (describing the bankruptcy

advertisement necessitating a disclosure requirement as stating that the advertiser
was a debt relief agency and the reasoning that a consumer might mistakenly
believe that bankruptcy assistance did not involve the fees involved with filing
bankruptcy absent the disclosure).
230
Id. As noted earlier, the Court found both that Milavetz's advertisement was
inherently misleading. and that "[t]he *likelihood of deception was "hardly a
speculative one." Id. Interestingly, there is a significant difference between the
possibility of deception being inherentand the possibility of deception being hardly
speculative; specifically, 'inherent' deception is a much higher standard than
'hardly speculative.'
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court faced in Milavetz.
Second, the three-tiered disclosures on eggs would probably
pass Zauderer'srational basis test because production methods affect
nutrient levels and risk of transmission of Salmonella233 and the state
has a legitimate interest in protecting and promoting public health.2 34
There is almost certainly a rational basis for the FDA's interest in
providing consumers with enough information to make distinctions
between products that are more or less likely to carry Salmonella
Enteritis.

The Zauderer rational basis test requires a reasonable
relationship, not a perfect fit, between the disclosure requirement and
the interest served. Thus, a government is entitled to attack a problem
piecemeal, unless the rights implicated by this policy are so
fundamental that strict scrutiny is necessary. Following Zauderer, a
disclosure requirement would not be vulnerable to legal challenges
merely because it does not fully solve the problem that is being
targeted.
Finally, the three-tiered system of disclosures on eggs is
neither unjustified nor unduly burdensome. In Milavetz, the Court
held that the compulsion of commercial speech was not unjustified or
unduly burdensome because Milavetz's rights were sufficiently
protected by a disclosure requirement that was reasonably related to
the government's interest. 23 Thus, following Milavetz, a disclosure
requirement that is reasonably related to the government's interest is
not unduly burdensome. Requiring production method disclosures on
eggs is neither unjustified nor unduly burdensome because the
requirement is reasonably related to states' interests in protecting
consumers.2 36
233 See

Compassion Over Killing, Inc. et al., supra note 1, at 25-28.
See id.at 57-59, 61-64.
23s Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1339-41.
236 One group estimates that mandatory certification and labeling of the three
proposed tiers would not directly affect the cost to producers in the third tier, Eggs
from Caged Hens, because they would not need to verify their labeling claim.
Compassion Over Killing, Inc. et al., supra note 1, at 67. Producers in the first and
second tiers, Free-Range Eggs and Cage-Free Eggs, would experience a .3 to .9
percent increase in the cost of certification and labeling, which would be
compensated for by consumer demand for humane products. Id at 67-69. There are
no regular substitutes for eggs, so consumers purchase almost the same number of
eggs when there are small increases in price. Id. at 69. Thus, given the relative
inelasticity of the market for eggs, it is estimated that a .3 to .9 percent increase in
the retail price of cage-free eggs would decrease demand only .02 to .05 percent. Id.
at 67.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Balancing the need for government intervention on behalf of
consumers with a respect for producer sovereignty is a delicate
endeavor, and one that has not yet been perfected. Currently, many
consumers are paying premiums for eggs adorned with images of
farms without knowing what those illustrations mean. Other
consumers are declining to pay for eggs with superior nutritional or
safety qualities because they do not have enough information about
how eggs are produced to know that those added qualities are
important, or they do not trust that labeling indicating those qualities
is truthful. Thus, there is a breakdown in the relationship between
consumer preference and the types of eggs consumers ultimately
choose.
Such a breakdown indicates a market failure, because egg
prices are not reflecting actual demand for food qualities, such as
increased nutrient content. Indeed, one may conclude that there is a
lower supply of high-quality food products (e.g., cage-free or freerange eggs) than there would be if this information asymmetry were
remedied. By mandating a disclosure system on egg cartons such as
the proposed three-tiered disclosures, regulators could correct the
asymmetry.
Compelling disclosure about egg production methods would
probably withstand a challenge under the Constitution because, under
Zauderer, states have a significant interest in preventing consumer
deception. Following precedent circuit courts established when
examining compelled disclosures, states also have a significant
interest in facilitating the purchase of safe and nutritious foods.

